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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the hypothesis that coaches in the National Football League are often too conservative
in their decision making on fourth downs. I used R Studio and NFL play-by-play data to simulate actual
football plays and drives according to different fourth down strategies. By measuring expected points
per drive over thousands of simulated drives, we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of different fourth
down strategies. This research points to a number of conclusions regarding the nature of NFL coaches on
fourth downs as well as the complexity of modeling and simulating decision making in a complex sport
such as professional football. While we are able to demonstrate areas where a more aggressive fourth
down strategy could be utilized to a team’s advantage, this research demonstrates that fourth down
decision is not a simple binary choice and that making this critical decision must be taken in context. In
other words, further research should be done that takes into account additional variables and their impact
on a team’s decision to “go for it” or not on fourth down.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The 2009 season marked a major turning point in the
use of analytics in the National Football League 1 . For
the first time, a large pool of data was available to teams
and statistical modeling gained popularity in front offices and on the field. One particular game during that
season is credited with bringing analytics into the spotlight. Coach Bill Belichick’s New England Patriot’s led
the Indianapolis Colts by six points and faced a fourthand-2 on their own 28-yard line. In these situations,
teams have three choices: punting the ball, giving possession to the other team but leaving them further from
a scoring opportunity; attempt a field goal for 3 points
(if within range); or go for it with the intention of earning a first down but run the risk of a turnover. In this
case, the Patriots were out of field goal range and going
for it could result in giving the Colts a very strong field
position. To the typical coach, a punt would seem like
the obvious choice. Instead, Coach Belichick chose to
go for it: they turned the ball over, the Colts gained possession deep into the Patriots’ territory, and ultimately
scored the game-winning touchdown on the ensuing
drive. Though Belichick’s decision proved costly, analytics proved that the decision gave the Patriots the greatest probability of victory 2 . This particular play, dubbed

the “Belichick fourth-and-2”, ultimately marked one
of the first times modern analytics gained widespread
coverage in the NFL.
A few years prior, the decision-making tendencies
of NFL coaches began to attract analytical scrutiny. For
example, using play-by-play data and dynamic programming, Romer 3 asserted that NFL teams’ behaviors
on fourth downs often fail to maximize their overall
chances of winning the football game. It was suggested
that coaches are too passive on fourth downs and elect
to punt or kick a field goal too often. One drawback of
this research was that it only covered fourth down scenarios with one yard to go for the first down. Though
limited in scope, Romer’s research began to show that
coaches and teams were lacking in their ability to select
plays, especially on fourth downs.
Building on Romer’s research, Causey, Katz, and
Quealy 4 developed what has since been termed the
“New York Times 4th Down Bot”. This expands on
Romer’s research to include optimal decision making at
every yard line and every yards-to-go distance on the
field (see Figure 1). Their research sought to provide an
impartial strategy for approaching fourth downs and
yielded results that would be considered very aggressive when compared to the typical coach’s decision making. For example, their model suggests a team should
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Figure 1. NYT 4th Down Bot

go for it on fourth-and-2 anywhere beyond their own
28-yard line, an idea that would seem extreme to the
vast majority of coaches. This is exactly the strategy that
was employed by Coach Belichick in the game versus
the Colts described earlier. Their research supports, in
summary, the idea that coaches are far too conservative
on fourth downs.
More recently, Yam and Lopez 5 found that teams
miss out on an extra 0.4 wins per year by not implementing a more effective fourth-down strategy. In their
research, Yam and Lopez account for additional factors
like time remaining, point differential, and the relative
offensive and defensive strengths of each team. They
draw a similar conclusion to past research: NFL coaches
are too conservative.

Figure 2. Proportion of fourth downs where the team went for it from
2009 to 2018. In other words, the proportion of run or pass plays on
fourth down.

Despite convincing research, the conservative nature
of the NFL on fourth downs has not changed in any
meaningful way in recent years. Figure 2 demonstrates
the relatively steady trend of fourth down decision making, with coaches electing to go for it between 11% and
14% of the time over the past 10 seasons. Despite an
uptick in 2018, the data shows little to no changes in decision making on fourth downs. This begs the question:
why is it that teams and coaches make decisions, particularly on fourth downs, that decrease their chances
of winning? The answer may lie more in behavioral
psychology than statistical analysis. A paper by Urschel
and Zhuang 6 points to risk and loss aversion as the
culprits of poor decision making, specifically on kickoff decisions. Their prospect theory-based model suggested that coaches tend to be overly cautious due to
a greater sensitivity to losses relative to wins. This potentially comes from external factors like the ridicule
faced when an aggressive play fails. In other words, the
conservative choice, though suboptimal, will yield far
less criticism. This idea of risk aversion could be one
of the many factors influencing the strategic decision
making of NFL coaches on fourth downs.
The purpose of this thesis is to test differences in a
team’s expected points by utilizing a very aggressive
fourth down strategy. Past research has shown a tendency of NFL coaches to act conservatively on fourth
downs. Despite a plethora of statistically significant
findings, coaches have continued to execute suboptimal
decision making in these situations. The 4th Down Bot
points out that more than half of all plays result in a gain
of 4 or more yards 7 so one would think that going for
it on fourth down would be more common, especially
when a team is within a couple of yards of a first down.
However, coaches have largely stuck to their traditional
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strategies and the use of an optimal decision-making
strategy, supported by analytical theory, to choose plays
is not widely adopted. One of the primary goals of this
paper is to further demonstrate the need for coaches in
the National Football League to approach fourth downs
in a less conservative manner. With the nflsimulator
package 8 , we are able to simulate drives according to
different strategies with the purpose of evaluating the
effectiveness of a rather extreme fourth down strategy.
The strategy is simple – regardless of field position, a
team will choose to go for it on fourth down. Along
different starting field positions, we aim to evaluate the
difference in expected points per drive in comparison
to a traditional fourth down strategy.
2 RESEARCH BODY
2.1 Data
In order to address this problem, we use NFL playby-play data from the National Football League’s
(NFL) publicly available Application Programming Interface (API). In particular, this API is accessed via
the well-known R statistical software 9 package called
nflscrapR 10 . This package allows users to analyze an
extensive library of NFL data on the single play, game,
and season level. The functions within this package
not only parse and clean the data from NFL.com but
provide detailed metrics to enhance data analysis. In addition, Elmore and Williams 8 developed an R package
called nflsimulator that is used to simulate plays and
drives using the data in nflscrapR. Note that a drive is
defined as a series of plays when the offensive team has
possession of the ball. A drive ends when the team’s
possession of the ball ends, either through a score, punt,
turnover, or the clock expiring.
The dataset used for simulating drives in this project
includes almost fifty thousand plays from the 256
games in the 2018 NFL season. For each recorded play,
nflscrapR provides over 250 individual variables ranging from simple items like the current yard line to more
complex data like the expected points added from air
yards on a pass play (“air_epa”). The level of granularity of the data allows for the nflsimulator functions to
capture necessary data to simulate drives.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Stimulating Drives
When we began the project, we wanted to simulate different fourth down strategies on a single drive basis and
estimate the average expected points for each. Using
the nflsimulator R package and the sample drive function in particular we are able to simulate individual
drives according to different strategies. The function
itself takes the starting yard line (measured as yards

from the team’s own goal), the data set used (in this
case 2018 play-by-play data), and the scenario or strategy being tested. Figure 3 shows an example play used
in the simulations.

Figure 3. A sample play from the NFL’s API, accessed by the
nflscrapR package 10 . Shows a random run play starting 60 yards
from goal on first down. Melvin Gordon ran for a gain of 23 yards to
the opponent’s 37-yard line.

Acting on the notion that NFL coaches are historically too conservative, we wanted to test a very aggressive fourth down strategy in comparison to what
NFL coaches typically decide on fourth downs. The
aggressive strategy in this case involves a team electing to go for it on fourth down regardless of the usual
decision-making variables such as down, field position, and yards to go. It is important to note that the
two strategies differ in the way they sample from the
play-by-play data being used. The normal strategy will
sample from the collection of actual plays as one would
expect, matching variables like down, yards to go, yard
line, etc for each new play in the drive. However, the
“going for it” strategy samples from first and second
down plays on second down, second and third down
plays on third, and third and fourth down plays on
fourth. In doing so, we eliminate some of the psychological effects of choosing to go for it on fourth down (as
there is no alternative in this strategy) while allowing
for a larger sample of plays.
A summary of the results comparing the two strategies is given in Figure 4. The results are based on running 1000 drive simulations for every five-yard increment between 5 and 95 under each respective strategy.
We are able to compare the two strategies directly with
regard to expected points per drive. A drive that ended
without a score (turnover or punt) results in zero points,
a touchdown is 7, a field goal is 3, and safety is 2. The
final expected points value for each yard line is the
average points per drive over all the simulations.
The results show that for the aggressive strategy (G),
the expected points per drive is higher from the 5-yard
line all the way to about the 40-yard line. At that point,
the normal NFL strategy (N) yields a higher expected
points value for all yard lines until the 95 (95 yards
from the team’s own goal). These results make sense
in context as the data represents singular drives, so a
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comes from the fact that a score for the opposing team
(strategy 2) results in a negative points value for the
home team (strategy 1). The results of the simulations
are shown in Figure 5. Note that these simulations are
based on 1000 drives at each yard line from 5 to 95 in
increments of five yards.

Figure 4. Graph is based on 1000 simulations of singular drives at
every five-yard increment on the field for two different fourth down
strategies. G represents the home team’s strategy of going for it on
fourth down no matter what, while N represents a team acting in
accordance with normal fourth down decision making. Expected
points per drive is the average points per drive of the simulation data.

simulation ends with either a turnover, a punt, or a
score. From the 5- to 40-yard line, going for it would
yield a higher amount of points, yet this does not factor
in the opposing team’s field position in the event of a
turnover. This is important to consider since turning the
ball over on a team’s own 10-yard line would almost
certainly lead to a score for the other team. However,
comparing the two at the 95-yard line is worthy of discussion. After trailing the N strategy for a majority of
the starting yard lines, the G strategy takes over again
at the 95. In other words, when a team starts a drive
5 yards from goal, going for it on fourth down would
yield greater expected points than acting in accordance
with the typical NFL coach.
2.2.2 Stimulating Until Score
After analyzing the two strategies on a singular drive
basis, we thought it was important to account for the opposing team’s chances of scoring on the ensuing drive.
For example, the opposing team’s expected points after
turning the ball over on your own 10 should be factored
into the drive simulation. In order to account for this
more realistic scenario, we utilized the sample drive
until score function from the nflsimulator package. This
function simulates drives until a team scores. The function takes into account factors such as field position
in the event of a turnover, punt distance when a team
elects to punt, and allows for the testing of the two
strategies against each other. By taking a home team
strategy and an away team strategy, we can assess how
a strategy stacks up against the other. With regard to calculating and storing expected points, the only change

Figure 5. Using the drive until score function, we were able to run
1000 simulations at each five-yard increment on the field and for all
four possible combinations of two fourth down strategies. The G in
GvN represents the home team’s strategy of going for it on fourth
down no matter what, while N represents a team acting in accordance
with normal fourth down decision making. On the y-axis is expected
points which is the average expected points per simulation.

Figure 5 shows it is important to account for the opposing team when testing a fourth down strategy. In
particular, the figure shows that a normal strategy for
fourth downs is optimal at the vast majority of yard
lines on the field when tested against the aggressive
strategy. The aggressive strategy is indeed overly aggressive and lacks nuance in its decision making. In
other words, home teams have higher expected points
at almost all yard lines when using a normal strategy
against a team that is using this very aggressive strategy. This makes sense when considering the fact that
going for it on fourth down every time, regardless of
field position or time of game, is not a realistic strategy.
Not only can it give good field position to the opposing
team, but it also could result in going for it in situations
that are difficult to convert such as fourth down and
25 yards to go. Overall, it became clear that simply going for it on fourth down no matter what would likely
lose out to the average NFL coach’s fourth down play
calling.
2.2.3 Drives Per Score
Next, we looked at an aspect of the simulation data
other than expected points, namely, the number of possessions before a score takes place (drives per score).

Fourth Down Decision Making
Figure 6 shows the distribution of drives per score for
each strategy at 10-yard increments on the field. These
yard increments are the starting yard line of the simulation. The overall distributions are as one would expect.
We see that the closer the starting yard line is to the goal
line, the fewer number of drives typically take place before a score. Looking closer at the comparison between
strategies shows the two scenarios that start with the
normal strategy (NvG and NvN) have a higher count of
drives with only one possession before a score. This is
likely due to the ability to kick a field goal, resulting in
teams having to travel a shorter distance before recording a score. Another aspect of the charts worth noting
is the spike in the dark blue line (GvN) at the 10-, 20-,
and 30-yard lines. For all 3, the GvN scenario has its
highest frequency at a value of 2 drives per score. This
suggests again that going for it close to your own goal
line will often lead to the opposing team scoring on the
following drive.

additional factors. This would include things like time
of game, opposing team’s skillsets and tendencies, or
the yards to go to the first down. Because a fourth and
15 and a fourth and 1 are very different scenarios in
the NFL, we chose to modify the existing fourth down
strategy to a cutoff point of 5 yards to go. For example,
a fourth down and under 5 yards to go results in going
for it, while a fourth down of 5 yards or over results
in the typical coach’s decision (usually a punt or field
goal). Figure 7 reflects this minor change in strategy on
the singular drive level.

Figure 7. Graph is based on 1000 simulations of singular drives at
every five-yard increment on the field for three different fourth down
strategies. G represents the home team’s strategy of going for it on
fourth down no matter what, G5 represents a strategy of going for
it no matter what when there is less than five yards to go, and N
represents a team acting in accordance with normal fourth down
decision making. Expected points per drive is the average points per
drive for the simulations.

Figure 6. Shows the frequency of drives per score at 10-yard increments for all four possible combinations of two fourth down strategies. The G in GvN represents the home team’s strategy of going for
it on fourth down no matter what, while N represents a team acting
in accordance with normal fourth down decision making.

2.2.4 Testing a New Strategy
After testing the rather extreme strategy of going for it
on fourth down no matter the circumstance, we wanted
to test another slightly different approach. The simulation data clearly pointed to the fact that a more effective
fourth down strategy would need to take into account

The figure shows that the new strategy (G5) yields
a higher expected points per drive than the original
aggressive strategy (G) at every yard line after 50. Not
only does it outperform our more aggressive fourth
down strategy, it has higher average expected points
than the normal NFL coach’s decision (N) at the 90and 95-yard lines. As we mentioned earlier, the earlier
yard lines (5-50) are harder to analyze without taking
into account the opposing team’s ensuing drive, so the
underperformance of the strategy at those yard lines is
not important to our results.
Figure 8 also shows an improvement over the original
going for it strategy when reevaluating the drive until
score simulations.
By comparing all three strategies when they are facing the typical decision making of an NFL coach, N, we
can compare the three on a level scale. Besides a couple
of interesting outliers at the 30- and 70-yard lines, the
normal strategy still performs the best when put against
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Figure 8. Uses the drive until score function to run 1000 simulations
at each five-yard increment on the field and for combinations of
opposing fourth down strategies. The G in GvN represents the home
team’s strategy of going for it on fourth down no matter what, the G5
in G5vN represents going for it only when there is less than five yards
to go to a first down, and N represents a team acting in accordance
with normal fourth down decision making. On the y-axis is expected
points which is the average expected points per simulation.

create a more realistic fourth down strategy.
Additionally, the project demonstrated a common
trend regardless of the strategy or functions being used
for simulation. In all data sets and for all strategies,
there is a noticeable drop off in expected points from
the 80- to the 85-yard line. This drop off is then followed
by a return to the normal trend at the 90-yard line (see
Figures 3, 4, 6, and 7). This could suggest a tendency
towards coaches acting more conservatively when 15
yards from goal then when they are 20 or 10 yards
from goal respectively. This odd finding is certainly
something to look into in future research.
In conclusion, simulating fourth down strategies in
the NFL has been the subject of extensive research often
suggesting that coaches are too conservative in their
decision making. The research in this paper supports
some aspects of this argument and reveals very promising paths for future research. The strategies employed
in our simulations demonstrate that a more aggressive strategy is warranted at certain yard lines and
that fourth down decisions should not be made with
one simple strategy, but with one that accounts for the
unique context of each and every play.
4 LESSONS LEARNED

an opponent with a normal strategy. However, the G5
strategy performs significantly better than the G strategy. This would suggest that the addition of this “under
5 yards to go” criteria to our going for it strategy leads
to a noticeable improvement in fourth down decision
making.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Overall, this project revealed interesting conclusions as
well as possible avenues for future research. By simulating NFL drives according to different fourth down
strategies, we were able to show that coaches are likely
too conservative on fourth downs in certain situations.
Starting with a simple approach of simulating single
drives, this research suggests that it is more beneficial
to always go for it when starting at the 95-yard line.
Furthermore, when simulating until a team scores, we
can see that going for it every time on fourth down does
not account for certain important aspects of the game.
We found that a fourth down decision must be taken in
the context of additional factors like the distance to the
next first down or score. By adding a single criterion to
the strategy where a team will go for it when it is fourth
down and less than 5 yards to go, we saw a large improvement in expected points per drive. This suggests a
possible idea for future research in which other factors
are tested to create a better fourth down strategy. We
could test other “yards to go” cutoffs or variables, like
time remaining and opposing team defensive ability, to

While conducting research for this thesis, I learned a
lot of valuable lessons outside of fourth down decision
making in the NFL. First and foremost, I was able to
greatly improve my knowledge and skill in the R programming language. My knowledge of gathering data,
manipulating data, constructing complex loops, and creating informative data visualizations were just some of
the many aspects of the language that I was able to add
to my repertoire. I learned about the time-consuming
nature of running thousands of simulations on a computer for hours on end, as well as ways to utilize additional computing power through the Parallel package 11 .
My advisors taught me the convenience of using Git
in order to directly link to an online repository, share
code with colleagues, and, in general, control a project
under a revision control system. Last and certainly not
least, I learned the importance of debugging as I assisted my advisors (Dr. Elmore and Dr. Williams) with
the early stages of the nflsimulator package. In doing
so, I acted as a test user to find and help correct errors in
a package made to handle complex problems and large
amounts of data. Overall, the experience provided me
an invaluable learning experience and exposure to the
application of analytics in the sports industry.
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